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Indigenous social movements began proliferating across Latin America in the late 20th 
century.  Since then, scholars have focused analyses on the factors shaping indigenous 
movement-state dynamics, with little consideration for how these interactions impact the 
larger indigenous population.  This work addresses the question of how changing 
indigenous movement-presidential relationships affect indigenous political attitudes and 
behavior in Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, qualitatively using comparative historical 
analysis, and quantitatively using binomial logistical and ordinal logistical regressions.  I 
conclude first that the inclusion of indigenous movements represents a democratic 
deepening, but has a destabilizing effect, as the system must expand and adapt to new 
actors; and second, that more representative and inclusive democracies do not necessarily 







The UN General Assembly declared 1993 as the International Year for the 
World’s Indigenous People.  That same year, Rigoberta Menchu, a Guatemalan activist 
of K’iche’ descent, won the Nobel Peace Prize for her tireless work combatting the 
persistent injustice faced by indigenous communities in Guatemala.  Menchu’s efforts 
raised global awareness of the plight of indigenous people.  In this sociopolitical context 
indigenous movements began proliferating across Latin America. 
In the central Andean countries of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, indigenous 
movements organized to resist neoliberalism, the prevailing economic model of the time.  
Broadly, their struggle consisted of a set of shared demands, including state led 
development, limiting the foreign sector, land reform and establishment of plurinational 
constitutions (Silva 2018).  In the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, highland indigenous 
organization culminated in the formation of national movements and formal political 
parties.  In Bolivia, Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) began as a coalition of left-wing 
organizations, spearheaded by future president and then leader of the coca growers union, 
Evo Morales, formalizing its status as a political party in the late 1990s.  In Ecuador, the 
nationally recognized organized indigenous movement is called Confederación de 
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and is a separate entity from the 
indigenous political party, Pachakutik.  Since the 1990s, the MAS and CONAIE 
indigenous movements have deployed their growing influence to advance indigenous 
rights within their respective countries, to varying degrees of success.  In Peru, 
indigenous organization in the highlands remains weak and fractured.  This is attributable 
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to several factors, including the Sendero Luminoso’s violent repression of indigenous 
organizations in the Peruvian highlands during the 1970s and 80s, and Alberto Fujimori’s 
decade-long authoritarian reign, which drastically recentralized the government and 
rejected ideas of pluralism (O’Neill 2006).   
Mass indigenous mobilization in Ecuador and Bolivia garnered such far-reaching 
support that their respective governments were obliged to begin acknowledging 
indigenous rights to an extent previously unseen in Latin America.  During the 1980s and 
1990s, state attitudes towards indigenous people in the region were generally classified as 
assimilationist (Rice 2017), yet by the 21st century, indigenous movements had managed 
to create “new spaces for collective action and transformed the relationship between 
indigenous people and the state” (Rice 2017, pg. 3).   
The late 20th century thus represents a turning point in the dynamics between 
indigenous groups and the state.  In Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous peasants were 
organizing and subsequently mobilizing for the first time on ethnic identity.  While in 
Peru, Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian style aimed to recentralize government and 
suppress ideals of pluralism, which partially explains the lack of political salience of 
indigenous identity in Peru.  The culmination of these movements in Bolivia and Ecuador 
were the election of populist, left leaning presidents, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa in 
2006 and 2007, respectively.  In Peru, movements were unable to gain traction due to 
political instability, however, in the beginning of the 21st century, presidential candidates 
such as Ollanta Humala and Alejandro Toledo aggressively courted their electoral 
support nonetheless to an extent not previously seen in Peruvian politics (Madrid 2011).   
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Regardless of the degree of political salience achieved by indigenous groups in 
each country, the state began considering indigenous groups as new actors in the 
domestic polity.  The evolution of the indigenous-state dynamic in the 21st century has 
been the subject of extensive scholarly research, which I explore in Chapter 1.  Although 
the research makes inferences about how these interactions elicited changes elsewhere in 
each country’s government and society, and in the internal dynamics of the organized 
indigenous movements themselves, it fails to explore how the interactions registered 
changes within the larger indigenous population.  A deeper understanding of political 
attitudes and behavior within the larger indigenous population could have profound 
implications for democratic stability in the region, particularly as governments must 
navigate the precarious balance between economic development and marginalized 
populations in the context of climate change.  Additionally, examination at the individual 
level helps determine whether changes in indigenous-state dynamics translate into 
tangible benefits for the people they claim to support.  To that end, this research asks how 
indigenous political behavior and attitudes changed in the 21st century based on 
indigenous interactions with leadership in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. To do so, I examine 
how scholars describe interactions between indigenous movements and the state and then 
categorize them into four different groups.  The literature focuses almost exclusively on 
factors shaping these dynamics, failing to consider the implications for the larger 
indigenous population.  This research contributes to current scholarship by analyzing the 
interactions between indigenous movements and presidents throughout the 21st century 
and classifying them by relationship type.  Using Latin American Public Opinion Project 
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(LAPOP) data, I measure changes in indigenous political attitudes and behavior over the 
same timeframe and associate these changes with these relationship types. 
Methodology 
 The independent variable is indigenous interactions with presidents in Ecuador, 
Peru and Bolivia from 2000 until 2019.  Analyzing scholarly works and newspaper 
articles, I provide a historical analysis of interactions between presidents and indigenous 
groups in each country in Chapter 2. I then characterize these interactions and sort them 
into a descriptive typology organized by interaction type.  The purpose of the typology is 
to synthesize qualitative findings and present them in a more succinct manner.  I then 
examine whether presidential interactions with indigenous groups corresponded to 
changes in political attitudes and behaviors in the larger population. 
 To measure the dependent variable, indigenous attitudes and behavior, I rely on 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey data from Ecuador, Peru and 
Bolivia.  Data is analyzed longitudinally, from 2004 to the most current data set, 2019.  
Political attitudes are measured through variables relating to trust in government 
institutions, political efficacy, and interest in politics.  Political behavior is measured 
using variables related to voting and protesting.  A dichotomous indigenous variable 
helps distinguish between indigenous and non-indigenous respondents.  Utilizing survey 
data to measure the dependent variable allows for more systematic assessment of changes 
at the individual level of analysis over a long period of time.  These three cases were 
selected due to the asymmetries in political climate and movement success:  Ecuador and 
Bolivia have had successful indigenous movements that culminated in a democratic 
deepening through the broad inclusion of indigenous people into national politics.  Peru 
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does not have a successful indigenous movement; significant political participation 
remains inaccessible to indigenous people and the central government is plagued by 
pervasive corruption, producing widespread mistrust and dissatisfaction with politics 
among the mainstream population.  Given these key differences, Peru serves as a control 
case to facilitate attributing changes in the dependent to the effect of indigenous 
movements, as well as highlight the possible outcomes associated with the continued 
disenfranchisement and marginalization of indigenous populations.   
 In chapter 1 I examine previous literature on indigenous movement-presidential 
dynamics and develop four relationship types based on salient themes in the literature.  In 
Chapter 2 I provide a qualitative overview of the trajectory of indigenous-state 
interactions and then categorize and sort these relationships into a descriptive typology.  
The quantitative analysis and discussion of findings is found in Chapter 3, followed by 





CHAPTER 1  
A Review of the Literature on Indigenous-State Dynamics 
 
Scholarship on indigenous-state relations can be divided into four different types 
of interactions.  The supportive type focuses on coalition building efforts and broadly 
classifies interactions as positive (Alberti 2015; Rice 2017; Madrid 2011), and marked by 
a bottom-up approach to leadership (Conaghan 2018; Silva 2018).  The detached type is 
characterizes by presidential indifference towards indigenous movements.  This 
indifference often materializes as presidents systematically excluding movements from 
substantive participation or passively ignoring demands.  Inherent to this type is a distinct 
top-down approach, in the sense that presidents are in the dominant position vis-à-vis 
movements and therefore are able to set the tone and extent of interactions (Silva 2018; 
Jameson 2011; Conaghan 2018). Tense relationships are marked by mutual hostility and 
often exists against a backdrop of social unrest (McNeish 2006; Albó 2004; Mayorga 
2006; Rice 2017).  Finally, presidential rhetoric that contradicts actual governance 
characterizes the discordant type.  The defining attribute of these interactions are 
presidents who embrace policies antithetical to their professed pro-indigenous stance 
(Bowen 2011; Becker 2013; Ellner 2012).    
Supportive Type 
Supportive relationships between presidents and indigenous movements consist of 
generally positive interactions and coalition building efforts between actors (Silva 2018; 
Conaghan 2018; Alberti 2015; Rice 2017; Madrid 2011; Albó 2004).  In Ecuador and 
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Bolivia, these efforts consisted of sustained mobilization of leftist organizations united in 
a common struggle against the last round of overtly neoliberal presidents from the 
beginning of the twenty first century.  A portion of these efforts also entailed forming 
alliances with ideologically compatible, charismatic leaders, who ultimately won the 
presidential election in their respective country.  Thus, in Ecuador and Bolivia, coalition 
building occurred vertically and horizontally—horizontally among grassroots 
movements, and vertically through forging ties with leadership.  Upon the election of 
Rafael Correa and Evo Morales, dynamics between the two presidents and their 
indigenous supporters evolved distinctly.   
Silva (2018) and Conaghan (2018) note that the vertical coalition between 
CONAIE and Correa strained after Correa was elected, as he systematically excluded the 
organized movement while generally retaining the support of the wider indigenous 
citizenry through his populist policies.  Morales maintained a strong connection to the 
vast grassroots network that comprised MAS (Conaghan 2018).  Alberti’s (2015) take on 
the evolution of the Correa-CONAIE and Morales-MAS relationships is consistent with 
Silva and Conaghan, although she emphasizes Morales’ eventual fall from grace.  By his 
third term in power, indigenous groups had become “ambivalent and conflictive” towards 
him (pg. 67), which is likely attributed to certain controversial environmental and 
economic decisions that called into question the authenticity of his commitment to the 
indigenous agenda.  Despite this, the enduring success of MAS even after Morales’ 
forced resignation in 2019 is a tribute to the supportive alliance that characterized much 
of his interactions with indigenous groups, as well as his bottom-up approach to 
leadership.  
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In Peru, the notable absence of organized indigenous groups in the highlands 
precluded opportunities for sustained positive interactions; the lack of an organizational 
apparatus with which to articulate demands and forge ties with leadership left individual 
groups widely disconnected from national politics.  Top-down vertical coalition building 
occurred as prospective presidential candidates courted the indigenous electorate.  
Madrid (2011) argues that during their presidential candidacy, Fujimori, Toledo and 
Humala’s positive interactions with indigenous people were motivated by a desire to gain 
their support, which they achieved by presenting themselves as co-ethnics.  These appeals 
featured both ethnic and populist overtones and were superficial in nature.  Ethnic 
appeals consisted of the use of indigenous symbols in campaigns, wearing traditional 
indigenous clothing and making proclamations in native languages at campaign events 
(Albó 2004), while populist appeals included denouncing existing political parties and 
elites and emphasizing plans to help the poor.  Madrid’s argument highlights an 
important distinction within this type, that is those who feign support for the indigenous 
to further their own political objectives, as well as the fluid nature of coalition building. 
For example, the Cocalero Union?, of which Morales was leader, embodied the broader 
struggle against foreign interests in Bolivia by spearheading opposition to U.S.-led coca 
eradication efforts in the Chapare.  Fragmented groups with similar grievances united and 
evolved into MAS.  The origins of Morales’ role in the movement were channeled first 
and foremost through his cocalero identity.  However, as more indigenous groups joined, 
and because indigenous identity already overlapped with many of the other identities 
involved (i.e. peasant, cocalero, laborer), the movement reinterpreted its identity on an 
ethnic basis. Morales’ identity as leader of the movement transformed simultaneously, as 
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his Aymara ethnicity became more prominent than that of cocalero.  Madrid’s argument 
implies the reinterpretation of identity to suit changing objectives. 
Detached Type 
Silva (2018), Conaghan (2018) and Jameson (2011) posit that some indigenous-
president dynamics are marked by physical or ideological distance between movements 
and leadership.  Scholars in this approach generally contend that what motivates leaders 
is a desire to remain autonomous, either genuinely or in appearance only, of indigenous 
movements.  Physical distance takes the form of presidential efforts to systematically 
exclude indigenous participation across various platforms, while ideological distance 
consists of presidents maintaining superficial proximity to a movement through the 
granting of minor concessions or tenuous access, while widely rejecting the ideology of 
the movement.  A president’s unwillingness to breach this physical or ideological divide 
characterizes this relationship type.  
In analyzing the Correa-CONIAE relationship, Silva (2018) and Conaghan (2018) 
argue that Correa’s top-down approach to governance is indicative of a desire to 
physically distance himself from CONAIE.  Correa achieved this by limiting CONAIE’s 
inclusion in substantive political processes.  For example, he excluded them from 
conventional participation by refusing to appoint indigenous people to significant 
political posts and barring CONAIE from weighing in on policy decisions, particularly 
those that would heavily impact their communities.  The 2008 Ecuadorean constitution 
grants indigenous communities the right to consultation prior to the government 
sanctioning mining activities in their territories.  This has been selectively honored, if not 
outright ignored, in practice (Walsh 2010).  Correa attempted to block nonconventional 
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participation by criminalizing indigenous and environmental activism.  This style starkly 
contrasts Morales’ supportive bottom-up approach as described in the previous section. 
Jameson’s (2011) argument focuses on how ideological distance is manifested in 
president-movement dynamics.  He concludes that governments navigate ideological 
divides between themselves and movements by granting minor demands, often as 
concessions, while simultaneously pursuing their own agenda.  In the context of Ecuador, 
Bolivia and Peru, the most salient example of this ideological distance regards economic 
policy.  With very little exception, political leaders of the region have pursued neoliberal 
economic agendas since the 1980s and 90s despite sustained opposition from indigenous 
movements.  Such opposition stems from the indigenous assertion that that this particular 
model benefits elites and further disadvantages marginalized populations.  In the Latin 
American context, the neoliberal model tends to rely on natural resource extraction, 
whose environmental ramifications pose numerous threats to indigenous culture and 
livelihood.  Presidents and presidential candidates have leveraged indigenous opposition 
to neoliberal practices to suit personal objectives, while quietly preserving their own 
ideological commitment to it. 
Tense Type 
Given the tumultuousness of Latin American politics, indigenous-state relations 
across all countries and time periods in this century always include an element of tension 
and civil unrest.  Indeed, significant change has never occurred in the central Andes or 
elsewhere in Latin America without deploying nonconventional participation to some 
degree by disenfranchised groups.  Scholars of this approach posit that tense relationships 
consist of mutual hostility and often occur against a backdrop social unrest.  All scholars 
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attribute the tension and unrest to extensive structural inadequacies, which diminish the 
state’s capacity to incorporate new actors (McNeish 2006; Albó 2004; Mayorga 2006; 
Rice 2017).   
McNeish (2006) argues that mass protests in Bolivia during the first decade of the 21st 
century was attributed to “lack of viable avenues for participation” (pg. 221), which were 
exacerbated by internal prejudices.  In the 1990s, Bolivia implemented a host of pro-poor 
policies that included the Law of Popular Participation, Agrarian Reform laws, and 
efforts to decentralize government administration and guarantee indigenous land titles.  
As a result, Bolivia was hailed as the gold standard in economic development.  However, 
by the early 2000s, many realized that the positive effects of these reforms had been 
grossly overstated, as rates of poverty had actually increased and access to political 
participation had greatly declined.  McNeish concludes that genuine democratic openness 
was severely lacking because participation was limited to certain groups and on the 
state’s terms.  
Mayorga’s argument combines McNeish’s (2006) focus on the inadequacy of avenues 
for participation with Conaghan’s (2018) emphasis on the failure of traditional political 
parties.  He echoes Samuel Huntington’s early work in arguing that a “crisis of 
governability”, in which the state could no longer interpret nor address social demands, 
explains the emergence of political outsiders, such as indigenous movements and populist 
leaders (2006, pg. 132; Huntington 1968).  He claims that these new actors constitute the 
largest contemporary threat to democracy in Latin America because they seek to 
undermine liberal democratic institutions and replace them with their own “utopian” 
 12 
version of democracy (pg. 133).  Mayorga’s argument implies that that liberal democracy 
and indigenous political ideology are mutually exclusive.   
In stark contrast, Albó (2004) argues that the emergence of indigenous movements as 
new political actors is “a very positive development” (pg. 31), because it represents the 
opening up of politics to formerly marginalized citizens. He argues that “the installation 
of democracies in the region, as imperfect as they may be, opens up political spaces 
within which the indigenous can organize and advance their rights in a context that makes 
it difficult for judiciaries and security forces to deny citizens’ rights guaranteed under 
both domestic constitutions and international conventions” (pg. 31).  Thus, the arguments 
of Albó and Mayorga (2006) align in their characterization of tense interactions marked 
by civil unrest, but diverge in their interpretation of the outcomes.  Albó also notes that 
many political parties were skeptical of ethnicity, which echoes Conaghan (2018) and 
Mayorga’s assessment that the perceived inadequacy of traditional political parties is a 
predominant variable in tense indigenous-president relationships.   
Rice (2017) asserts that, through the struggle and protests of the 1990s, indigenous 
movements achieved a new space for collective action in the 21st century.  This new 
paradigm emphasizes participation through conventional and nonconventional means.  
Rice argues that although indigenous social movements continue to rely on protest, which 
is emblematic of a tense relationship with the state, it is precisely through this 
deployment of nonconventional participation that they have achieved better access to 
conventional participation, in the forms of voting, traditional political parties, and 




This type is characterized by a president professing sympathy towards indigenous 
movements, while selectively honoring movement demands as part of a broader scheme 
to preserve the existing socioeconomic hierarchy.  Arguments within this approach are 
generally aligned.   
Bowen (2011) argues that leadership incorporates indigenous movements into the 
political system superficially to minimize threats to existing elites.  Becker (2013) 
describes a type of symbiosis that exists between indigenous movements and certain 
political parties, namely, “leftist political parties cannot gain traction against the 
entrenched economic and political interests of the traditional oligarchy without the 
enthusiasm and energy of mass social movements, but neither can social movements 
achieve their ambitious transformative agenda without gaining control over governmental 
structures” (pg. 45).  Presidents have come to rely on indigenous social movement 
support to further their political objectives, even when these objectives conflict with the 
movement’s agenda.  To this end, they placate the movements through gestures of 
solidarity to retain their endorsement.  Ellner (2012) defines interactions through 
leadership’s attempts to consolidate power through legitimate constitutional processes, 
such as referenda, frequent elections and efforts to promote direct participation.  These 
measures are successful largely through the support of indigenous movements, despite 
the fact that their tacit objective is to preserve existing political structures.  Ultimately, 
21st century leaders’ failure to authentically incorporate indigenous actors into politics 
demonstrates a pervasive unwillingness to genuinely address systemic oppression for fear 
of threatening the existing social hierarchy (Bowen 2011; Becker 2013; Ellner 2012).   
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CHAPTER 2  
Understanding Presidential-Indigenous Dynamics in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia from 
2000-2020: A Historical Analysis 
 
 This chapter provides an in-depth qualitative analysis of interactions between 
indigenous movements and presidents from 2000-2020 in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.  
Interactions are characterized into one of the four relationship types outlined in the 
literature review (supportive, detached, discordant, tense) and organized into a 
descriptive typology.  Table 1 illustrates the central actors in presidential-indigenous 
movement dynamics within the three cases. 
Table 1: Key Actors in Indigenous-Presidential Dynamics 
Case Name of national 
indigenous movement 
Size of national indigenous 
movement 
Name of indigenous 
political party  
Bolivia Movimiento Al 
Socialismo (MAS) 
Large MAS 




Moderately Large Pachakutik 
Peru None N/A None 
 
Table 2: Descriptive typology of relationships between presidents and indigenous 
organizations 2000-2020 
 
Supportive Detached Tense  Discordant  
Mesa 2003-2005 Quiroga 2001-2002 Palacios 2005-2007 Gutierrez 2003-2005 
Morales 2006-2019 Rodriguez 2005-2006 Sanchez 2002-2003 Toledo 2001-2006 
Vizcarra 2018-2020 PPK 2016-2018 Garcia 2006-2011 Humala 2011-2016 
 Noboa 2000-2003   
 Correa 2007-2017   
 Moreno 2017-present   




Summary of types: 
 
 Supportive- This type consists of generally positive interactions, coalition 
building efforts between movements and leadership and a bottom-up approach to 
governance. 
 
 Detached- This type is characterized by presidential indifference towards 
indigenous movements, which takes the form of political exclusion and ignoring 
demands.  Characterized by a top-down approach to governance.  
 
 Discordant- This type is characterized by presidential actions that contradict the 
indigenous rights they purport to support.  
 
 Tense- This type consists of mutual hostility and usually exists against a backdrop 





Background:  CONAIE and President Jamil Mahuad 1998-2000. 
Ecuador was in a state of turmoil in 1998.  Amid a crippling recession and 
runaway inflation, President Jamil Mahuad announced his plan to salvage the failing 
economy.  Central to this plan was a push to dollarize Ecuador, whose currency at that 
time was the Sucre.  The dollarization plan drew fierce opposition that exacerbated the 
existing and widespread unrest and ultimately erupted into a full-scale mobilization 
against Mahuad (Jameson 2011).  These uprisings, of which CONAIE was a primary 
player, culminated in Mahuad’s ousting in 2000 (Buckley 2000).  Mahuad’s departure 
represented a victory for CONAIE and solidified their position as a major actor in 
domestic politics at the beginning of the 21st century.  The leaders of the uprisings 
established a junta to replace Mahuad.  Called the Government of National Salvation, the 
junta was comprised of CONAIE president Antonio Vargas, Col. Lucio Gutierrez and 
Carlos Solorzano.  They were in power for 24 hours before Mahuad’s vice president, 
Gustavo Noboa, was sworn in as president (Buckley 2000; Darling 2000).  Although the 
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junta only lasted for 24 hours, the fact that CONAIE was a major force in toppling what 
they perceived as an ineffectual president, and then CONAIE president Antonio Vargas 
was a founding member in the junta, is indicative of CONAIE’s ascendant trajectory. 
Detached: CONAIE and Gustavo Noboa 2000-2003 
 CONAIE had finally gained a national platform to promote indigenous interests 
and seemed positioned to enjoy more influence within the political system, the ultimate 
goal of which was achieving greater recognition from the state (Albó 2004; Rice 2017).  
However, CONAIE was disappointed that their work to topple Mahuad only resulted in a 
replacement with identical political and economic ideals, Vice President Gustavo Noboa.  
As such, they vocally opposed Noboa’s government from the outset (Darling 2000; 
Ecuador: protests 2000).  Cognizant of CONAIE’s proven track-record of effecting 
change through mobilization and protest, Noboa sought to minimize the potential for 
social tensions before the upcoming election cycle by committing to continuous dialogue 
with CONAIE (Gerlach 2003).  In Noboa’s first month as president, CONAIE presented 
a list of demands, which included tangible measures to end corruption and poverty, as 
well as economic reforms (Darling 2000).  CONAIE also stated its intention to call for a 
national referendum.   
 Gerlach (2003) outlines three main gestures of goodwill extended by Noboa to 
CONAIE.  First, remaining true to his word, he engaged in negotiations with Antonio 
Vargas and reached a tentative agreement on improving healthcare, education, land rights 
and housing for indigenous and poor people.  In exchange, Vargas agreed that CONAIE 
would not incite or participate in any uprisings.  Second, Noboa established the “El 
Fondo Indígena” (The Indian Fund) with money from the Inter-American Development 
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Agency and the Ecuadorean government.  Third, he agreed to unfreeze bank accounts and 
grant amnesty to low-level participants in the January 15th uprising.  While the 
government was granting these minor concessions to maintain social harmony, they were 
simultaneously pursuing the neoliberal reforms outlined by Mahuad’s administration.  
Such reforms included austerity measures, such as terminating gas and food subsidies, as 
well as initiatives to expand the privatization of mining, oil and telecommunications and 
finalization of the plan to dollarize the economy (Jameson 2011).  Furthermore, Gerlach 
notes, Congress denied CONAIE’s request for a referendum on the grounds that national 
referenda must have congressional approval, which this one did not.  Additionally, Noboa 
quietly changed the financial terms of the initial agreement with CONAIE to allow the 
central government more fiscal flexibility.  In response, Vargas terminated negotiations 
and shortly thereafter, mass uprisings ensued in response to the austerity measures.   
Interactions between Noboa and CONAIE were characterized by a notable give 
and take, where Noboa was open to dialogue and granted some superficial concessions, 
but did not budge on CONAIE’s more substantive demands relating to the economy.  
Understanding how powerful CONAIE had become, Noboa’s desire to maintain open 
dialogue represented a strategy to appease the indigenous organization, rather than a 
genuine desire to include them.  On this Noboa stated, “We're willing to build schools, 
roads, and make infrastructure improvements, especially in Indian Areas, but they have to 
work with us…” (Jameson 2011, pg. 66-67).  Also, CONAIE had popular support to call 
for a referendum but was ultimately blocked by Congress.  Thus, CONAIE gained 
changes through concessions and protest, not conventional participation within the 
political system, from which they had been intentionally and systematically blocked.  The 
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Noboa-CONAIE relationship is characterized as detached.  Neither party was outright 
hostile or overly supportive, Noboa maintained an open dialogue while deliberately 
maintaining CONAIE at arm’s length from any real influence over the policy process. 
Detached to Discordant:  Lucío Gutierrez 2003-2005 
 While in prison for his role in the January 15th uprising that deposed Mahuad, 
Lucío Gutierrez published a summary of the historic uprising, in which he strongly 
implied his consideration of a future presidential bid, saying, “I would try to form a 
movement of national identity in which would come together the aspirations of all the 
people and nationalities of Ecuador….We think of a great movement that integrates the 
Indians, the blacks, the mestizos and all of the underprivileged of this country” (Gerlach 
2003, pg. 227).  Gutierrez was subsequently pardoned by Noboa and later announced his 
intentions to run in the 2002 presidential elections. 
 Gutierrez had an existing relationship with CONAIE through their mutual 
participation in the January 15th uprising.  He hailed from a humble background and his 
darker complexion gave him a more ethnically proximate appearance to indigenous 
voters than previous presidents (Freedom House 2004).  Gutierrez won the presidency 
largely through the support of a CONAIE-Pachakutik coalition and the relationship 
between his government and the indigenous movement started strong.  As a gesture of his 
commitment to greater inclusion for marginalized groups, Gutierrez named 3 indigenous 
people to top cabinet positions, an unprecedented number for the time (Jameson 2011).  
His agenda, he promised, would prioritize measures to end corruption and combat 
poverty, especially in rural indigenous areas.  It soon became apparent that the economic 
policies he favored conflicted with the pro-indigenous discourse underpinning his 
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agenda.  For example, he encouraged private investment in the oil industry and he 
increased bus fares and oil prices, opposition to which have been central to CONAIE’s 
platform for decades (Freedom House 2004; Jameson 2011).   
The relationship eroded over time and eventually, two inciting factors caused the 
terminal rupture between Gutierrez and the indigenous coalition that backed him.  First, 
Gutierrez began cozying up to the U.S. and took several friendly visits to Washington.  
Second, he entered into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (Jameson 
2011; Freedom House 2004). These actions were in stark opposition to indigenous 
demands, among which were limiting foreign investment in key industries through 
nationalization and the rejection of transnational lenders, whose financial support was 
accompanied by strict terms that often disadvantaged the poor.  Prominent indigenous 
groups viewed these actions as a betrayal.  Pachakutik publicly revoked support and 
CONAIE was left suspicious of Gutierrez’s true motivations (Conaie decidió desconocer 
gobierno del coronel Gutiérrez 2004).  Shortly thereafter, the Gutierrez-CONAIE 
dynamic broke down completely.  The indigenous ministers serving in his cabinet 
resigned or were forced out (Protestas callejeras en rechazo al precio de los combustibles 
2003).  CONAIE eventually cut ties, but its relationship with Gutierrez left the 
organization internally divided and disconnected from its base (Madrid 2008).  As a 
result, CONAIE retreated from the national spotlight to regroup and did not participate in 
the subsequent uprisings that removed Gutierrez in 2005 (Conaie decidió desconocer 
gobierno del coronel Gutiérrez 2004).   
Gutierrez-CONAIE interactions at the beginning were mutually supportive.  
Gutierrez’s promises to be sympathetic to the indigenous agenda while simultaneously 
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advancing overtly neoliberal economic policies, which included U.S. backed efforts to 
expand foreign investment in oil as well as working with the IMF, revealed a dissonance 
between his rhetoric and actions that is consistent with a discordant relationship.    
Discordant to Tense: Alfredo Palacios 2005-2007 
 Gutierrez lost popularity quickly by imposing harsh economic austerity measures 
while simultaneously consolidating power.  Social tensions rose steadily during his 
presidency and were further inflamed by his decision to dissolve the Supreme Court 
(Gutiérrez declara estado emergencia y disuelve la Corte Suprema 2005).  Mass uprisings 
led by the Forrajido movement ensued.  The Forrajido movement was comprised of 
mostly mestizo and working-class citizens and was led by future president Rafael Correa 
(Silva 2018).  Internally divided and alienated from their base, CONAIE declined to 
participate (Madrid 2008).  Amid the chaos, Congress eventually voted to remove 
Gutierrez and Alfredo Palacios assumed power. 
 Like his predecessors, Palacios was strongly committed to neoliberal reforms.  
The Palacios-CONAIE relationship is widely unremarkable.  There is no available 
scholarly work dedicated to his presidency in the context of this research, and very few 
newspaper articles focus on different interactions between him and CONAIE during his 
short two-year presidency.  The majority of available work focuses on Andean Free 
Trade Agreement (AFTA), which this research considers as the defining issue of the 
CONAIE-Palacios relationship.  Negotiations for AFTA began in 2003 and drew broad 
opposition and social unrest across Ecuador, to such a degree that Ecuador withdrew 
from collective negotiations to engage in individual negotiations with the U.S. (Andean-
U.S. Free-Trade Agreement Negotiations 2005).  In November of 2005, CONAIE led a 
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march of thousands of indigenous people from across Ecuador’s diverse regions to Quito, 
to demonstrate their fierce opposition to AFTA.  Upon arrival, they shared a private 
audience with President Palacios to outline their grave concerns about how the signing of 
AFTA would disproportionately impact their communities (Palacio dialogó con indígenas 
en Carondelet 2005).  They demanded that Ecuador withdraw from AFTA negotiations 
and expel US-based Occidental Petroleum Corp (“Oxy”) from the country over alleged 
financial misconduct.  Palacios heard their concerns but was undeterred.  The signing of 
AFTA was planned for March 23, 2006 and the government declined to act expeditiously 
in the matter of Oxy’s expulsion.  In response, CONAIE led another round of mass 
uprisings, which were so fierce and widespread that several northern provinces were 
completely paralyzed.  Palacios deployed the military to “restore order” by any means 
necessary (Creamer 2006; Ecuador: Militant Opposition to Andean Free Trade 
Agreement Blockades Several Regions, Moves to Capital 2006).  CONAIE issued a 
manifesto on March 20th, condemning the signing of the AFTA and accusing the 
government of acting in the interest of wealthy elites (CONAIE manifesto 2006).  One 
sentence from the communique perfectly embodies the indigenous struggle since the 
1990s: “We are tired of the rich and powerful in our country; they violate the law, 
swindle, steal and in the end have total impunity” (CONAIE manifesto 2006).  
Ultimately, Ecuador did expel Oxy and AFTA negotiations were suspended indefinitely.  
The Ecuadorean Government stated increased oil revenues as the rationale behind Oxy’s 
expulsion, though sustained pressure from CONAIE is cited as a prominent factor by 
external sources (Ecuador cancels an oil deal with Occidental Petroleum 2006). 
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 Although Palacios’ time in office was brief, the chaos surrounding AFTA in many 
ways defines his relationship with CONAIE.  Palacios’ willingness to engage in dialogue 
about AFTA after the initial march to Quito presents him as sympathetic the indigenous 
movement.  However, AFTA negotiations proceeded nonetheless and were held in the 
strictest of secrecy with only wealthy economic and political elites present.  Palacios 
declined to invite indigenous representatives or incorporate indigenous demands in the 
negotiations.  This demonstrates that Palacios did not give genuine consideration to 
CONAIE’s articulated concerns about AFTA.   
The Palacios-CONAIE relationship further decayed after the March 2006 
uprising.  CONAIE refused to continue recognizing the authority of Palacios’ 
government, and Palacios accused the indigenous movement of attempting to overthrow 
democracy (Las protestas indígenas en Ecuador contra el Tratado de Libre Comercio se 
intensifican 2006).  The matter of AFTA inspired such mutual hostility between Palacios 
and CONAIE, this relationship would be classified as Tense. 
Tense to Detached: Rafael Correa 2007-2017  
Rafael Correa ascended to the presidency through the support of a broad leftist 
coalition, which included both CONAIE and Pachakutik.  From the outset, CONAIE had 
high hopes that a Correa presidency might finally bring many of their long-held demands 
to fruition.  His movement, dubbed the “Citizen’s Revolution” promised “economic, 
social and political policies that emphasized economic nationalism, state-led 
development, redistributive social policies to improve social equity, ecologically 
sustainable development, clean government, observance of citizen rights, agrarian 
reform, and effective support for indigenous peoples’ rights, especially over territory” 
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(Silva 2018).  Correa aggressively courted indigenous support through ethnic and 
populist appeals (Madrid 2008).  For example, his swearing in ceremony took place in the 
Andean town of Zumbahua.  He wore traditional dress and was presented with a scepter 
to represent the bond between his administration and the indigenous communities across 
Ecuador.  Upon receiving it, he vowed “I will never fail you” (Caseli 2011).   
Correa estranged himself from CONAIE soon after his election because of what 
many experts have classified as intentional efforts to systematically exclude the 
movement from the national dialogue.  This exclusion was part of Correa’s broader 
attempt to consolidate power.  Despite this, Correa retained the support of the larger 
indigenous population, who attributed the tangible improvements in their lives to his 
social policies (Becker 2013; Silva 2018).   
The terminal rupture in the CONAIE-Correa relationship is attributed to the 
following:  First, Correa labelled CONAIE an interest group and based on this, shut them 
out of the policy process (Silva 2018; Conaghan 2018).  Correa created public policies to 
serve “popular sector interests” (Bowen 2011) while simultaneously excluding groups 
representing such interests from the policy-making process (Silva 2018; Bowen 2011; 
Radcliffe 2012).  Second, In June 2010, Ecuador hosted a summit on minority rights in 
Latin America in Ótavalo, a town sacred to indigenous tradition.  Leaders and lawmakers 
from all over Ecuador and Latin America, including Evo Morales, attended.  Invitations 
were not extended to CONAIE or Pachakutik (Caseli 2011).  Third, Correa aggressively 
pursued extractive activities in indigenous territories, despite earlier promises not to, 
while selectively honoring if not outright ignoring the constitutionally protected right that 
impacted groups be consulted (Silva 2018; Becker 2013; Walsh 2010).  Fourth, Correa 
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repressed indigenous organization and criminalized activism, which included detaining 
activists without due process, forbidding indigenous organizations from participating in 
politics, and declaring any organizations not formally authorized by the state illicit 
(Becker 2013; Ecuador’s Indigenous People See Protest ‘Criminalized’ Under Correa 
2016).  As a result, by the end of his first term, Correa had lost the support of CONAIE, 
while generally retaining support of the larger indigenous population (Silva 2018). 
The Correa-CONAIE interactions have hallmarks of both a tense and a detached 
relationship.  However, for the purposes of this research, it will be classified as detached.  
The tension and mutual hostility flared toward the middle and end of his decade long 
presidency are a direct result of his intentional efforts to exclude CONAIE.  Distancing 
himself from CONAIE provoked the unrest, which waxed and waned, while the distance 
was pervasive throughout his presidency. 
Detached to Detached: Lenin Moreno 2017-2021 
Lenin Moreno served as Correa’s vice president from 2007-2013 and in 2017 he 
was elected president, campaigning on a platform of continued populist policies as 
championed by his predecessor.  The tenuous relationship between Correa and CONAIE 
caused indigenous people to overwhelmingly support Moreno’s rival, Guillermo Lasso, 
in the 2017 elections (Madrid 2012).  When Moreno was declared the winner, CONAIE 
published an open letter to the new president, which reaffirmed their collective demands, 
encouraged Moreno to take advantage of this opportunity to make genuine change and 
reiterated their commitment monitoring his politics (CONAIE Press Bulletin 2017).  This 
relationship opened on a positive note.  During a December 2017 meeting with CONAIE 
leadership, Moreno agreed to suspend all new mining permits and scrutinize existing 
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permits that were suspected of noncompliance, including the requisite (but often ignored) 
measure to consult affected indigenous territories.  Additionally, Moreno agreed to 
mandating bilingual education, supporting community transportation infrastructure, and 
titling land to indigenous communities (Tras cita con CONAIE, Lenín Moreno detiene 
conseciones mineras 2017). 
Moreno inherited an economy in turmoil due to Correa’s overreliance on oil 
exportation and mineral extraction to fund his extensive social programs.  The 7.8 
magnitude earthquake of April 2016, combined with a dip in global oil prices, which 
began in 2014, produced a recession (Bristow and Kueffner 2019) in which the fiscal 
deficit reached 8% of GDP (Bello 2019).  Second, throughout Correa’s decade long 
presidency, public spending had increased to almost 40% of the country’s GDP, and by 
2016, debt exceeded the legal limit of 40% of the GDP (Bristow and Kueffner 2019).  By 
this time, public sector wages had almost doubled and corruption was rampant.  For 
example, The Economist reports that five major projects featuring PetroEcuador included 
roughly 2.5bn in overbilling by contractors (Bello 2019).  To confront the growing crisis, 
Moreno enacted harsh austerity measures.  A key feature of his economic recovery plan 
was a multibillion dollar IMF loan whose terms stipulated that effective immediately, the 
government must terminate the 40-year old fuel subsidies on which Ecuador’s poor and 
indigenous heavily relied (Ecuador’s New Economic Plan Explained 2019).  The price of 
diesel more than doubled overnight, with a commensurate hike in bus fare (Chappell 
2019).   
Unrest ensued immediately.  Protests began in early October and lasted 11 days, 
during which time a state of emergency was declared and Moreno moved the capital to 
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the coastal city of Guayaquil for fear that protestors would storm the capitol in Quito.  On 
October 12th, Jaime Vargas, leader of CONAIE, agreed to enter negotiations with the 
president.  He cited the following demands: The fuel subsidy be reinstated, that the 
negotiations be broadcast national television networks, and that the president promise to 
discuss the cessation of extractive activities in their territories (Valencia and Taj 2019).  
The two parties reached an agreement on October 13th, and President Moreno promised 
to repeal Decree 883 immediately.  Upon hearing this news, indigenous protestors 
celebrated, cleaned up the city, and promptly went home.   
In the wake of the protests and subsequent talks with CONAIE, Moreno 
announced the government’s intention to establish a new plan to stabilize the economy, 
based on the principal that “those who have more, pay more” (Ecuador President 
Proposes New Finances Reforms after Turmoil 2019).  Centered on wealth redistribution, 
the plan proposed to include new taxes on high earning businesses, and on certain items, 
such as plastic bags.  No tangible improvements from this plan ever materialized.  
Subsequent interactions between CONAIE and Moreno were not overtly friendly.  In 
October of 2020, CONAIE filed a lawsuit against Moreno for crimes against humanity 
for his response to the October 2019 protests (Ecuador: Citizens reject economic 
decisions to please the IMF 2019; Ricci 2020).  The commission’s finding that Moreno’s 
government used excessive force to repress protestors in October of 2019 was made more 
egregious by the additional finding that Moreno was acting unconstitutionally when 
entering into the first IMF deal.  In March of 2020, Moreno announced another set of 
austerity measures as part of an IMF loan to address the dire economic situation in the 
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wake of COVID-19 (Ecuador: Citizens reject economic decisions to please the IMF 
2019).  By 2020, Moreno had an approval rating of 9% (Ricci 2020).   
The Moreno-CONAIE relationship is characterized as Detached.  Although his 
presidency is marked by the October 2019 uprisings for their scope and duration, mutual 
hostility was not the salient theme of interactions.  Throughout his presidency, Moreno 
showed a willingness to dialogue with CONAIE, but did not incorporate any of their 
demands or suggestions into his decisions, consistent with a distanced relationship.   
 
Bolivia 
Background:  Hugo Banzer and indigenous people 1997-2001 
 Former military dictator Hugo Banzer was democratically elected in 1997 under 
the slogan “Pan, Techo y Trabajo” Food, Shelter and Work (McNeish 2006).  His 
government’s primary focus was combatting poverty by strengthening democracy.  To 
that end, he enacted the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (BPRS) which aimed to 
expand avenues of participation to civil society by creating a national dialogue on matters 
such as resource allocation and economic policy (Albó 2004; Mayorga 2006).  Later 
studies revealed that this did very little to expand participation or alleviate poverty, as 
poverty indicators worsened and frequent, and violent protests indicated that avenues to 
conventional participation were inadequate (McNeish 2006).  One such example of this 
were the Cochabamba Water wars, which was a series of protests that occurred in 
Cochabamba from 1998-2000 in response to the privatization of Cochabamba’s 
municipal water supply.  Banzer also adopted a hardline anti-drug agenda, which aimed 
to systematically eradicate the cultivation of coca in the highlands.  Feeling that their 
culture and livelihood was increasingly threatened by neoliberal policies and coca 
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eradication efforts, a broad coalition of leftist social movements, including labor unions, 
peasant unions and cocaleros (coca grower unions) began organizing (Madrid 2012; 
Conaghan 2018; Silva 2018).  The movement continued gaining momentum and national 
influence, eventually adopting the name Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) (Conaghan 
2018).  
Detached: Jorge Quiroga 2001-2002 
Jorge Quiroga, Banzer’s vice president, assumed power when Banzer resigned 
due to health concerns.  An extensive review of the literature and available newspapers 
revealed that there was almost no sustained dialogue or meaningful interactions between 
Quiroga and MAS, most likely a result of Quiroga inheriting the presidency (and thus not 
needing to appeal to indigenous groups for support), as well as his short time in office.  
Needless to say, the most meaningful aspect of his presidency in the context of this 
research was the continuation of Banzer’s aggressive coca eradication campaign in the 
Chapare.  This shortsighted campaign failed to consider the socioeconomic ramifications 
for vulnerable and marginalized populations who depended on the coca trade for their 
livelihoods.  Furthermore, neither Banzer nor Quiroga offered an alternative development 
plan for affected populations (Hooper 2005; Mayorga 2006).  This, along with Quiroga’s 
continued commitment to neoliberal economic policies, further emboldened MAS, who 
staged uprisings and protests across the country (New president takes over in Bolivia 
2001).   
Quiroga’s adherence to a neoliberal agenda through the systematic eradication of 
coca characterized his interactions with MAS.  There was no overt hostility on behalf of 
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his government, yet Quiroga’s agenda stood in opposition to the indigenous demands 
articulated by MAS.  These interactions are consistent with a detached relationship.   
Detached to Tense: Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada 2002-2003 
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, known as “Goni”, served his first term as president 
from 1993-1997 and was later reelected in 2002.  Goni was a strong proponent of 
neoliberal economic reforms, however, mindful of the potential negative effects to 
indigenous people, he enacted some corrective measures and also promoted new rights 
for indigenous people (Albó 2004).  This relationship began on a positive note, but was 
soon embittered by the event that came to define his presidency: the Gas Wars and 
subsequent brutal repression of protestors, for which Goni was later tried and convicted 
in the United States in 2018 (Ramos 2018). 
The Gas Wars erupted in October of 2003 in opposition to Goni’s plans to export 
natural gas through Chile to the U.S.  This plan was highly contentious due to vast 
opposition to natural gas privatization and the acrimonious relationship between Bolivia 
and Chile, which began with the Atacama border dispute in the 1800s and was 
exacerbated by the War of the Pacific, when Bolivia lost its Pacific coastline and became 
a landlocked state.  MAS spearheaded the protests, and soon more groups of laborers, 
coca farmers and other indigenous and non-indigenous organizations of the left joined.  
In response to the unrest, Goni dispatched the military, who engaged in brutal repression.  
Goni attempted several times to quell the unrest, the most notable of which was to offer a 
referendum on the issue of natural gas exportation (Assies 2004).  McNeish (2006) 
importantly notes that the referendum did not include the citizens most opposed to the 
reforms, rural and indigenous populations.  MAS and others on the left continued to 
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demand his resignation.  Goni eventually conceded and submitted his resignation on 
October 17, 2003 (Octubre negro: cronología del caso que enlutó a Bolivia 2018).  Evo 
Morales, the leader of MAS and a highly visible indigenous figure in the Gas Wars, later 
centered his presidential campaign on the nationalization of key industries, which he 
promptly enacted upon winning the election (Relea 2003). 
The majority of scholarly works and newspaper articles contextualize Sanchez de 
Lozada’s interactions with MAS and other indigenous groups by the Gas Wars.  This 
research therefore considers the Gas Wars, a bloody and violent event, the issue that 
defines the Goni-MAS interactions and characterizes the relationship as tense.   
Tense to Supportive: Carlos Mesa 2003-2005 
Carlos Mesa was Goni’s vice president and assumed power after Goni was 
deposed.  His presidency, although short-lived, is considered a major turning point in 
Bolivian politics.  At this time, the national dialogue was centered on the question of 
natural gas nationalization (Relea 2003), a contentious topic which further exacerbated an 
existing regional divide between the leftist indigenous people of the highlands, and the 
traditionally wealthy, European descendants of the eastern lowlands (Webber 2010; 
Assies 2004).  Counterintuitively, Mesa enjoyed sustained support from MAS and 
Morales despite the fact that his policies were not overtly aligned with the indigenous 
agenda.  Some speculate that this was a calculated move on Morales’ part to present 
himself as more politically moderate to attract conservative mestizo voters in anticipation 
of the 2006 elections (Webber 2010).  Indigenous groups unaffiliated with MAS did not 
support Mesa, as they felt his policies served the interests of the wealthy elite who 
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demanded open markets and business ties with neighboring countries (Webber 2010; 
Forero 2004).   
Mesa was caught between blocs with diverging interests:  the leftist indigenous 
highlanders and the conservative European lowlanders.  He spent the entirety of his 
presidency precariously navigating these opposing forces, never fully committing to 
either side.  This led to the eventual collapse of his government.  On this Webber says,  
“His neoliberal reformism was insufficiently generous in its concessions to the October 
Agenda to secure the support of the left-indigenous bloc, which began to assert once 
again the necessity of fundamental structural solutions to the problems of racism, 
poverty, inequality, class exploitation, and imperialism. At the same time, the eastern-
bourgeois bloc was growing increasingly discontented with his moderate adherence to the 
minimal demands of the October Agenda” (2010, pg. 57).  Although Mesa eventually lost 
the support of MAS for what they perceived as a weak stance on royalties for foreign 
companies operating in Bolivia, his presidency began with a proclaimed commitment to 
supporting indigenous rights (Relea 2003).  He appointed two indigenous cabinet 
members and executed a referendum on the natural gas industry and taxes, promising to 
commit to gradual nationalization of the gas industry (Webber 2010; McNeish 2006). 
The Mesa government is an interesting study within the Bolivian case.  The non-
MAS affiliated leftist indigenous groups opposed him throughout the duration of his 
presidency, yet MAS under Morales’ leadership was his closest political ally until shortly 
before his resignation (Webber 2010).  Assies (2004) suggests that this very allegiance 
explains the absence of demonstrations and uprisings during his presidency.  When the 
government set out to reform the new hydrocarbons law, MAS demanded 50% royalties 
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be charged on the profits of foreign gas companies (Webber 2010), which Mesa, not 
wanting to anger his neoliberal backers, failed to enact.  In response, MAS publicly 
denounced Mesa and mobilized grassroots forces to stage uprisings across the country in 
what had come to be known as the second gas wars.  This event ultimately prompted 
Mesa’s resignation in 2005. The issue of full gas nationalization became the cornerstone 
of Morales’ presidential campaign in 2006 (McNeish 2006).   
Although the end of Mesa’s presidency was marked by mutual hostility with 
MAS, the majority of their interactions were supportive.  It is notable that Mesa did not 
make grand gestures of support to the indigenous cause, instead, MAS, under the 
guidance of Morales, intentionally moderated its stance on many issues to better align 
itself with Mesa.  One must also reiterate the divergence between MAS and non-MAS 
indigenous groups in their attitudes towards Mesa.  Indigenous groups vehemently 
opposed him and his neoliberal economic policies, despite his close alliance with Morales 
until they cut ties in 2004.  Although the relationship terminated amidst widespread social 
unrest, the majority of interactions preceding the second Gas Wars were consistent with a 
supportive relationship.  
Supportive to Detached: Eduardo Rodriguez 2005-2006 
Following Mesa’s resignation, Eduardo Rodriguez, then Chief Justice of the 
Bolivian Supreme Court, assumed the presidency on an interim basis.  When he assumed 
power, social unrest was ongoing over the question of whether or not to nationalize the 
natural gas industry (El jefe de la Corte Suprema, Eduardo Rodríguez, Sucede a Carlos 
Mesa como president de Bolivia 2005).  There is scarce literature dedicated to 
Rodriguez’s policies or governance and what is available focuses on the unprecedented 
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circumstances facing Bolivian society at that time: four presidents in 5 years, widespread 
civil unrest, a country divided by region, race, ethnicity and class, and the ongoing and an 
increasingly acrimonious national debate on the gas industry.   Rodriguez did not make 
any significant changes during his short time in office, stating that his primary goal was 
not to raise his political profile, but to restore order in anticipation of a general election.  
Rodriguez announced that he would respect the results of Mesa’s referendum on 
hydrocarbons and would let the winner of the 2006 general elections address the 
lingering question of whether to nationalize the natural gas industry (El jefe de la Corte 
Suprema, Eduardo Rodríguez, Sucede a Carlos Mesa como president de Bolivia 2005; de 
Zárate 2014).  A divide between MAS and the larger indigenous population appeared 
under Mesa and widened throughout Rodriguez’s presidency.  Morales extended a truce 
to Rodriguez, further inflaming tensions with other indigenous groups who continued to 
demand the full nationalization of the natural gas and hydrocarbon industry (Bolivia 
prepara la reforma constitutional para renovar todos sus cargos politicos 2005). 
As there is little available evidence of sustained interactions between Rodriguez 
and MAS, whether positive or negative, this relationship is characterized as detached. 
Detached to Supportive: Evo Morales 2006-2019   
Evo Morales was elected president of Bolivia in 2005 and assumed office in 2006.  
A rural coca farmer of Aymara descent, he emerged as the leader of Bolivia’s coca 
growers union (cocaleros) in the 1980s through his campaign against U.S. led efforts to 
eradicate coca farming in the Chapare region of Bolivia (Albró 2019).  In many ways, the 
social conflicts of the previous years, most notably the coca eradication of the Chapare, 
the Water Wars of 2000 and the Gas Wars of 2003 and 2005, shaped Morales’ 
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presidential agenda as he promised to finally deliver results on many of these long-held 
grievances of the indigenous population.  Such grievances included decolonizing and 
nationalizing key industries, extending political inclusion to marginalized groups, and 
expanding environmental protections in indigenous territories.  In this way, the Morales 
presidency breached the existing divide in the indigenous community between MAS 
supporters and non-MAS, as MAS began attracting more support from previously 
unaffiliated indigenous people.  According to LAPOP data, in the 2005 elections, 9% of 
indigenous people voted for Evo Morales and MAS, while 20% of indigenous people 
supported Morales and MAS in 2009. 
 Prior to Morales’ election, indigenous Bolivians experienced inequitable access to 
avenues to conventional participation (Albró 2019; McNeish 2006).  Recognizing this, 
Morales’ movement forged a path to participation for the country’s most marginalized 
citizens.  He made early campaign promises to protect their political and human rights by 
vowing to write a new constitution.  Bolivia adopted the new constitution in 2009, which 
defines Bolivia as plurinational, non-capitalist state, guided by the Quechua principle of 
Buen Vivir, or Living Well (van Schaick 2009). Once elected, Morales staffed 14 out of 
the 16 cabinet positions with indigenous men and women (Albró 2019).  As MAS gained 
popularity, more and more indigenous people were elected to regional and national posts, 
thus expanding indigenous political inclusion.  The broad inclusion of indigenous people 
into politics is one of the greatest achievements of Morales’s presidency (Albró 2019). In 
bringing awareness to the indigenous cause, Morales also gave visibility to the 
indigenous way of life, which is often absorbed and overshadowed by the dominant, 
capitalistic culture.  
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Two main pillars of Quechua culture are the good of the group over that of the 
individual, and deference to nature and the environment.  Their conception of 
development emphasizes collective advances, such as a new school or clinic for the 
community, and remains strictly opposed to the extraction based economic development 
strategies pursued by modern Latin American governments (Bjork-James 2020).  Seeing 
their territory destroyed, stripped of resources or sold off to private interests, indigenous 
people have witnessed firsthand the harmful effects of economic development policies 
centered on natural resource extraction.  In 2006 Morales announced his economic plan 
called Bolivia Digna, Soberana, Productiva y Democratica Para Vivir Bien, which 
denounced such unsustainable practices, and promised to align Bolivian development 
with the tenets of Sumak Kawsay—living in harmony with nature, placing spiritual well-
being over acquisition of goods, and collaboration over competition (Pinneo 2014).   
Further exemplifying his purported commitment to environmentalism, he passed an 
unprecedented Law of Mother Earth in 2012, the first of its kind, which equates nature’s 
rights with human rights (Ramirez 2019).  In 2010 he sponsored a UN Resolution, which 
makes access to clean water and sanitation a human right (Ramirez 2019).  These large 
shows of support for environmental protection endeared him to indigenous and 
environmental activist groups nationally and internationally for a time. 
Six years into his presidency Morales began losing the trust and support of his 
indigenous backing because he diverged from his pro-environment platform.  The initial 
rupture came in 2011 when his government tried to build the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de 
Moxos highway through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory 
(Stauffer 2018; Bjork-James 2020).  He fostered relationships with opposition groups in 
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agribusiness that were built on concessions, which included everything from promoting 
biofuels to “not following through on the regulation of the social-economic functions of 
medium-sized landholdings and business-scale landholdings, which allowed large 
landowners to preserve their ownership of land.” (Bjork-James 2020).  The divide further 
widened when he constructed a $34 million presidential skyscraper and residence in the 
historical Plaza Murrillo (Stauffer 2018), a move that stood in stark contrast to the values 
of Buen Vivir he supposedly espoused.  Throughout all of this, Morales was quietly 
consolidating his power in defiance of the presidential term limits outlined in the new 
constitution, resulting in his serving 13 years and 3 terms in power (Stauffer 2018).  After 
disputed results for election to what would be his 4th term, Morales fled to Peru in fear for 
his safety (Stauffer 2018).   
Evo Morales changed the face of Bolivian politics and society.  He gave a voice 
to the country’s millions of disenfranchised indigenous people and improved their quality 
of life drastically: Poverty fell from 60% in 2006 to 35% in 2017 (Dearden 2019) and 
indigenous culture gained hitherto unknown prominence in society.  These interactions 
were both Supportive and Discordant in nature.  However, despite a contentious end to 
his presidency, his legacy is overall a positive one and is widely consistent with a 
Supportive relationship. His symbolic gestures were insufficient to retain indigenous 
support.  According to 2019 LAPOP survey data, only 5.5% of indigenous respondents 
indicated that they would support the current? president.  Jeanine Añez served as interim 





Much of the literature on Peruvian indigenous movements focuses on Amazonian 
groups, who have historically had better organizational capacity and national visibility 
due to ongoing disputes over extractive practices in the Amazon.  As such, the Peru case 
will not use a specific indigenous organization as the unit of analysis, because highland 
indigenous organizations are regional, tend to only represent regional interests, and 
interact more sporadically with national leadership and thus are not equivalent to the 
movements analyzed in Ecuador and Bolivia.  Therefore, this section will use the term 
“indigenous organizations” or “indigenous people” to collectively refer to the individual 
indigenous movements of the highlands and assumes that these atomized groups broadly 
align in their objectives and views on national leadership. 
Background: Alberto Fujimori 1990-2000 
While campaigning for the presidency, Alberto Fujimori actively courted the 
indigenous electorate.  This strategy consisted of adopting a pro-indigenous discourse 
while simultaneously distancing himself from elites.  Outsider status was central to his 
political platform.  He also wore traditional indigenous dress, held campaign events in 
sacred locations and employed indigenous symbology throughout his campaign (Madrid 
2011).  At the same time, Fujimori made populist appeals that appealed poor and 
disenfranchised people, many of whom were indigenous.  For example, he focused his 
campaign in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas and promoted his ideas to alleviate 
poverty, such as legalizing street vendors and to creating a bank to lend to businesses in 
the informal sector (Madrid 2011).    
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Once elected, Fujimori did not fulfill any of these promises.  He dramatically 
restricted civil liberties, aggressively centralized the government and overtly rejected any 
ideals of pluralism (Albó 2004).  He adopted a robust market-oriented economic agenda 
that went in direct opposition to many of his pro-poor campaign promises, and while it 
stabilized the economy, it left impoverished citizens far worse off (Madrid 2011; Boesten 
2007).  Fujimori’s administration was hostile to indigenous people.  From 1996-2001, his 
government undertook a forced sterilization campaign in the Peruvian highlands.  
Occurring only in the highlands, the campaign was sold to the public as family planning 
assistance.  It was later revealed that the project’s true intention was economic benefit, 
because poor indigenous people were perceived to be preventing economic growth, 
Fujimori attempted to alleviate this by forcibly restricting their population size (Boesten 
2007; Ko 2021) 
After winning reelection once, Fujimori’s regime finally collapsed in 2000 and 
left Peru in disarray.  It destroyed democratic institutions, weakened political and social 
actors and further disadvantaged vulnerable populations.  Despite his authoritarian 
legacy, he is widely credited with defeating the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group. 
Discordant: Alejandro Toledo 2001-2006 
 Alejandro Toledo was elected president during a precarious time in the ongoing 
dynamic between Peruvian indigenous people and the state.  He employed similar 
campaign strategies as Fujimori to woo electoral support from indigenous people, 
speaking frequently of his Incan roots and wearing traditional Incan clothing (Albó 2004; 
Madrid 2011).  Toledo was of indigenous decent and was raised in rural poverty in the 
Chapare, apart from that, however, he was far removed from Quechuan culture, having 
 39 
been educated in the U.S. and now positioned firmly among Peru’s elite (Peru Reports).  
Toledo employed populist rhetoric to win over indigenous voters by denouncing political 
parties while his wife, a Belgian, spoke Quechua on his behalf at campaign rallies.  
Similar to Fujimori, Toledo campaigned directly to the poor, many of whom were 
indigenous.  For example, he often held events in poor neighborhoods and promised to 
expand social programs, such as health insurance for disadvantaged women and children, 
agricultural banks to provide loans to small farmers, and promises to improve sanitation 
of shanty towns in Lima (Madrid 2011; Greene 2006).  Additionally, Toledo aggressively 
sought alliances with indigenous and peasant organizations.  
 To fortify his alliance with the indigenous community absent genuine 
commitments to economic reform, the first lady created the National Commission on 
Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (CONAPA).  The Commission elicited 
heavy criticism from the general public for its presumably political motives and 
conspicuous lack of indigenous leadership.  In response to this, Toldeo attempted to 
regain some approval points by creating the Development Institute for Andean, 
Indigenous, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (INDEPA) as a concessionary 
gesture (Greene 2007; Greene 2006)  
Many of these overtures to indigenous people were little more than empty 
gestures.  Despite his promises to pursue the core demands of the indigenous agenda and 
his efforts to expand political inclusion1, his presidency was plagued by scandal and 
accusations of corruption (Puertas 2004; Forero 2004).  Despite this, there was an 
explosion of ethnic politics under Toledo as Andean and Amazonian groups tried to unite 
                                                        
1 Madrid (2011) reports that 70% of congressional representatives had indigenous surnames in the 2001-
2006 session of congress. 
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under one large umbrella organization.  Toledo’s pattern of contradicting words and 
actions is consistent with a discordant relationship.   
Discordant to Tense: Alan García 2006-2011 
Alan Garcia served his first term as president from 1985-2000, during which time 
his mismanagement of economic and social issues left a weak and divided Peru aptly 
positioned for authoritarian Alberto Fujimori to win the election.  García narrowly beat 
left-of-center candidate Ollanta Humala in 2006. 
 García aggressively pursued a neoliberal economic agenda underpinned by robust 
and unapologetic mining practices in the Peruvian Amazon.  Indigenous people perceived 
this as a direct assault on their territory and cultural rights, garnering García immediate 
and sustained hostility from indigenous people for the entirety of his presidency (Stetson 
2012).  Determined not to repeat the economic disasters of his first presidency, experts 
report that his dogged commitment to economic growth above all else was achieved at 
the expense of socioeconomic development, (Welcome, Mr. Peruvian President: Why 
Alan García is no hero to his people 2010; Collyns 2010) 
Much of the indigenous-García dynamic involves Amazonian groups, as the 
salient interactions involving the two centered on oil, mining and logging rights by 
multinational corporations in the Amazon.  Garcia further marginalized indigenous 
communities by not consulting them about these practices, which provoked a massive 
uprising in Bagua that killed as many as 40 indigenous protestors.  Despite later 
admitting that not consulting indigenous groups was wrong (Welcome, Mr. Peruvian 
President: Why Alan García is no hero to his people 2010), Garcia’s government engaged 
in a propaganda war, which smeared indigenous people as antidevelopment (Stetson 
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2012).  They aired short clips of indigenous demonstrations, portraying them as blood 
thirsty and violent criminals trying to harm the humble policemen.  Garcia’s government 
publicly accused the indigenous people of wanting to hold Peru back from development 
(Aiello 2009; Collyns 2010).  Garcia’s legacy is a bloody one, the Guardian reports that 
“According to Peru's public ombudsman, 195 people were killed in clashes with security 
forces between January 2006 and September 2011; most of them died during García's 
five-year term” (US Congress offers support for Peruvian Amazonia land disputes 2009; 
Peru’s indigenous people:  From García to Humala their battle goes on 2012). The 
sustained, mutual hostility between indigenous groups and García, which unfolded 
against a backdrop of widespread civil unrest, is consistent with a Tense relationship.  
Tense to Discordant: Ollanta Humala 2011-2016 
Ollanta Humala employed similar strategies as Fujimori and Toledo to appeal to 
indigenous voters by prominently featuring ethnic demands in his campaign for 
presidency.  For example, he called for recognition of Peru as a multicultural country and 
endorsed multicultural education and the use of indigenous languages in the military and 
government offices.  He demanded the legitimization and incorporation of traditional 
practices of indigenous medicine and justice, and vocally denounced ethnic inequality.  
He purported to support a redistributive and state led economic model and vowed to 
defend Peru’s natural resources from foreign exploitation, in stark contrast to Toledo’s 
heavy reliance on foreign investment and resource privatization (Madrid 2011).  As a 
result, he won the support of Peru’s indigenous organizations. 
 Shortly into his presidency, Humala passed a historic law giving indigenous 
people the right to consultation on mining projects on their territories, a measure that was 
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repeatedly blocked in all forms by García (Collyns 2010).  Although this represented a 
historic victory for indigenous people, it soon became apparent that Humala would fail to 
deliver on many of his most prominent pro-indigenous campaign promises, especially 
regarding economic policy (Ollanta Humala Peru Reports; Peru’s indigenous people:  
From García to Humala their battle goes on 2012; Stauffer 2011).  Furthermore, given his 
pivot away from the leftist ideology espoused while campaigning in favor of a distinctly 
more market-oriented approach, people were rightly skeptical about whether the new 
consultation law would be genuinely upheld (Stauffer 2011).  This concern came to 
fruition, as protests erupted over government approval of the U.S.-led Conga mine in the 
Cajamarca region (Peru protests at huge Conga gold mine in Cajamarca 2011).  
As social tensions flared, Humala publicly called for dialogue with indigenous 
groups to resolve the disputes, while quietly deploying the military to repress protests 
(Peru’s indigenous people: From García to Humala their battle goes on 2012).  Amazon 
Watch reports 150 conflicts over the environment and mining in the highlands under 
Humala (Miller 2016). 
 Interactions between Humala and indigenous people had elements of a supportive 
relationship, such as the Law of Consultation, and of a tense relationship, such as the 
militaristic handling of social unrest.  However, the salient feature of interactions 
overtime were Humala’s tendency to promise one thing to indigenous people and then do 
different thing in practice.  Therefore, this relationship is characterized as discordant.  
Humala was a vocal supporter of the indigenous agenda, yet failed to deliver on almost 
all substantive promises throughout the duration of his presidency. 
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Discordant to Detached: Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 2016-2018 
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, known as PPK, had previously served twice as economy 
minister and mining minister.  He supported free market economic policies and made 
frequent claims about wanting to improve socioeconomic equality in Peru, though he 
made no specific mention of indigenous people in these promises (Who is Peru’s new 
leader Pedro Pablo Kuczynski? 2016).  Besides supporting an initiative to broadcast news 
and radio in Quechua to fight discrimination of indigenous people, there is no evidence of 
any notable interactions sustained over time between PPK and indigenous organizations 
(Nickolau 2016; Peru’s Indigenous Language Push 2017).  Shortly after winning the 
election, evidence implicating PPK in a graft scandal surfaced, and proceedings to 
remove him began in 2017 (Fowks 2017; Kurmanaev and Zarate 2019).  He resigned in 
2018.  
Detached to Supportive: Martin Vizcarra 2018-2020 
Literature about the relationship between indigenous highland communities and 
Vizcarra is sparse.  This can be explained by several factors.  First, as he was not elected 
outright, he did not personally need to forge bonds with indigenous communities through 
overtures of support for their cause.  Second, Peru’s political history is one of rampant 
corruption and profound instability, and as a result, trust in political institutions is among 
the lowest in Latin America (Carrión 2019).  Accordingly, Vizcarra’s agenda seems to 
focus mainly on anti-corruption efforts.  In 2019 he enacted his constitutional right to 
dissolve a Congress whose internal political rivalry was obstructing the government’s 
ability to legislate (Quigley 2019; Tegel 2019).  Congress responded by accusing him of 
executing a coup on Peruvian democracy and attempting to suspend him (Tegel 2019).  
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Vizcarra’s dissolution of Congress meant that new general elections would be called, 
empowering Vizcarra to govern by decree in the meantime.  Ultimately, this move gained 
him great popularity among Peruvians, as evidenced by his approval rating jumping from 
52% in September to 82% in October (Quigley 2019).  Third, the indigenous groups 
native to the Peruvian Amazon are embroiled in more visible conflicts given that the 
majority of natural resource extraction, a highly contentious and widely reported on issue, 
occurs in the Amazon.  Finally, highland indigenous communities do not have an 
organized, national movement (Callirgos 2018; O’Neil 2011; Yashar 1998), in stark 
contrast to Ecuador and Bolivia who have highly organized and politically mobilized 
highland indigenous movements.  Peruvian highland communities, therefore, do not have 
a formalized communication apparatus to articulate their demands or maintain dialogue 
with leadership. 
 Unlike Correa and Morales, who appealed to indigenous groups on a wide breadth 
of long-held issues, Vizcarra made no formal commitments about broadly incorporating 
the indigenous platform into national politics.  However, he has made one promise to 
indigenous groups:  in a July 2019 meeting with indigenous leaders, Vizcarra doubled 
down on a May 2018 promise that his administration would title all indigenous 
communities by 2021 (AIDESEP y Presidente Vizcarra se reúnen para asegurar titulación 
de todas las comunidades indígenas para antes del 2021 2019).  This would be a huge 
step forward for indigenous rights, and by default, environmental protections.  Studies 
suggest that indigenous people face more bureaucratic hurdles to becoming titled than 
non-indigenous people (Getting a Land Title in Peru Almost Impossible for Indigenous 
Communities 2015; Fraser 2019) and government agencies are ill equipped to navigate 
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the complexity of requests due to lack of cultural understanding (Fraser 2019).  Further 
studies indicate that land titled to indigenous groups show smaller rates of deforestation 
and are generally healthier than non-indigenous owned counterparts (Blackman, Corral, 
Santos Lima, Asner 2017).   
 Unlike Correa and Morales who endeared themselves to indigenous groups by 
purporting to enforce strict environmental regulations and curb resource extraction in 
their territory (although ultimately failing to do so), Vizcarra has made no such promises. 
In fact, in July of 2019 he granted a permit for the Tia Maria mine, a project that has been 
in limbo for a decade due to local opposition (Cervantes 2019).  Vizcarra’s government 
has opposed a bill proposing to close off portions of the Amazon to logging to protect 
vulnerable indigenous communities from exposure to coronavirus.  As of 2014, 21% of 
Peru was controlled by mining concessions, most of them foreign (de la Flor). Vizcarra 
presided over a country heavily occupied by multinational mining operations, while 
indigenous people, lacking formal representation, resort to mass protests to oppose these 
practices and the damage inflicted to their communities (DuPee 2019).  In November of 
2020, Congress voted to remove Vizcarra on vague charges of corruption and 
mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic.  A popular uprising in support of Vizcarra 
ensued, as many Peruvians saw him as the only viable means to ending rampant 
corruption in the political system (Armario and Briceno 2020).  Indigenous people 
protested the ousting of Vizcarra and demanded the new president, Manuel Merino, step 
down.   
The relationship between indigenous organizations and Vizcarra had ups and 
downs, with periods of hostility and unrest interwoven with periods of great support and 
 46 
mutual admiration.  The extent of Vizacarra’s indigenous support was only apparent after 
his forced departure, when thousands took to the street in protest.  Vizcarra did not make 
grand promises to indigenous people and then quietly do the opposite, nor did he woo 
their support for personal gain.  He adopted a transparent and pragmatic approach early, 
and evidence suggests that he attempted to act in good faith, despite the occasional and 
fierce unpopularity of some environmental and economic decisions.  Overall, relationship 
is characterized as supportive. 
 
Figure 1: Relationship type by year 
 
 
While president-indigenous movement relationships during the first 8 years of the 
twenty first century all show variability by type across all three countries, relationships 
tended to be more volatile in Peru and Ecuador.  Stability in relationship types in Ecuador 
and Bolivia from 2008-2018 are attributed to the decades-long presidencies of Morales 
and Correa.  This is a compelling finding when considering the relative strength of each 






and more frequent periods of discordant and tense relationships, the two types generally 
associated with negative interactions.  Bolivia, who has the strongest indigenous 
movement, has longer and more frequent periods of detached and sympathetic 
relationships, generally associated with neutral or positive interactions.  Thus, larger 
indigenous movements are associated with more positive president-movement 
relationships. However, as we will see in the subsequent section, they are not always 
associated with democratic institutional stability.  The relationship between well-
organized indigenous movements and positive president-movement relationships could 
be explained by the fact that larger indigenous movements tend to have the clout and 
resources available help their preferred candidates get elected.  Conversely, some 
presidents may feel obliged to maintain positive relationships with the larger, more 
powerful movements to minimize the likelihood of protests and social unrest.  Indeed, 
both the Ecuadorean and Bolivian movements have a proven track record of removing 
undesirable presidents through mass mobilization and the deployment of nonconventional 
tactics: CONAIE was a principal actor in deposing two Ecuadorean presidents since 
1996, and the Bolivian indigenous movements that comprise MAS led the mobilizations 
that ousted two presidents since 2000.   
Bolivia and Ecuador have had significant presidential instability and extremes 
throughout the 21st century:  Ecuador has had three partial term presidents due to being 
forcibly deposed (Mahaud, Palacios Gutierrez) and one president who consolidated 
power over time to eventually serve a full decade in office (Correa); Bolivia has had four 
partial term presidents (Mesa, Quiroga, Rodriguez, Sanchez) forcibly deposed and one 
president who consolidated power to end up serving over a decade in office (Morales).  
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Both Correa and Morales enjoyed widespread support from indigenous people.  In 
contrast, Peru is known for extensive government corruption and dysfunction, yet has had 
all but one president in the past two decades serve full terms (PPK).  These findings 
would suggest that while the political inclusion of indigenous movements certainly 
strengthens democratic institutions by extending participation to previously 
disenfranchised populations, thereby increasing representation, it may have a 
destabilizing effect on politics as Huntington suggested. As these movements gain power 
and meaningful access to further their agenda, the system becomes more susceptible to 




Regressions and Discussion of Findings 
 
Analysis 
This section proceeds in two parts.  The first part features a broad exploration of 
political attitudes, behavior and efficacy in the general populations of Ecuador, Bolivia 
and Peru from 2000-2019.  Political efficacy will be examined in addition to indicators 
for attitudes and behavior because it assesses the health of civil society, which is directly 
linked to citizen participation and perception of politics.  In the second part, I will focus 
my analysis on the indigenous population in the year 2019, using binomial and ordinal 
logistic regressions and controlling for standard demographic and socioeconomic factors. 
 
To measure political attitudes, I rely on two LAPOP questions: 
 
1. To what extent do you trust political parties?  Responses were coded from 
(1)not at all – (7) a lot. 
2. To what extend do you trust the president?  Responses were coded from 
(1)not at all – (7) a lot. 
3. How much interest do you have in politics:  A lot, some, a little, none? 
Responses were coded from (1) none – (4) a lot. 
  
To measure political efficacy, I rely on the following LAPOP questions: 
 
1. Politicians care about what people like you think.  To what extent do you 
agree or disagree with this? Responses were coded from (1) strongly disagree 
– (7) strongly agree. 
2. You feel that you have a good understanding of the most important political 
issues in the country.  To what extend to you agree or disagree with this?  
Responses were coded from (1) strongly disagree – (7) strongly agree. 
 
To measure political behavior, I rely on the following LAPOP questions: 
 
1. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or public 
protest? Results originally coded as (1) yes or (2) not.  
 50 
2. If the next presidential elections were this week, what would you do? 
Responses were coded as (1) I wouldn’t vote, (2) I would vote for the current 
president or party, (3) I would vote for the opposition candidate or party, (4) I 
would cast a blank ballot. 
 
 
General trends in political attitudes and behavior over the 21st century 
 




The previous section concluded that stronger indigenous movements are 
associated with more positive president-movement dynamics, but may have a 
destabilizing effect on democratic institutions, if only temporarily, as the system adapts to 
accommodate new actors and demands.  Figure 2 generally supports that claim.  Bolivia, 
the country with the strongest indigenous movement of our 3 cases, has consistently 
higher percentages of participation in a protest in the past 12 months.  In some cases, it is 
more than twice as high as Ecuador.  For example, in 2016 there are 13 percentage points 
difference between Ecuador and Bolivia’s participation.   
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Contrary to expectations, Ecuador’s rates of participation in a protest are 
consistently below 10%.  This could be attributed to the criminalization of protest under 
Correa, which certainly discourages widespread participation.  It could also be that 
people were generally satisfied with his policies and governance and therefore did not 
feel compelled to protest.  Despite opposition from CONAIE, most rural, poor and 
indigenous communities benefitted from Correa’s drastically increased social spending.  
To achieve local improvements, Correa diverted federal funding through local 
municipalities, who were charged with the undertaking of various public work projects in 
the name of the central government.  Thus, citizens of these communities saw tangible 
improvements as coming directly from Correa’s government.  Under this clientelist 
system, Correa ensured their ongoing support by establishing a direct link between local 









Figure 3 shows that on average, people would vote for the opposition candidate or 
party if elections were next week.  This illustrates the general cynicism and distrust of 
politics in these three countries.  For example, even in years with more popular presidents 
(such as Vizcarra in Peru from 2018-2020), respondents still indicated they would vote 
for the opposition, on average.  The closest we see to a value of 2 (I would vote for the 
current candidate or party) is in Ecuador in 2008 and 2014, which coincide with Correa’s 
presidency.  In 2016 and 2018, respondents were more likely to vote for the opposition in 
Ecuador on average.  This aligns with Moreno’s presidency.  Figures 4 and 5 support 
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The results of Figure 4 are somewhat counterintuitive based on the results of the 
historical analysis and the descriptive typology of relationships.  Conaghan (2018), 
Madrid (2008) and Mayorga (2006) all argue that it was the failure of traditional political 
parties that permitted political outsiders to emerge, indigenous political parties and 
presidential candidates more specifically.  Therefore, one would assume that the rise of 
MAS, whose inclusive platform and overwhelming popularity in national politics, would 
generate higher levels of trust in political parties among the people. Instead, trust declines 
sharply the year Morales (and MAS) take office and remains at below average levels until 
2019.  This suggests that MAS did not enjoy high levels of support in the larger 
population.  Shockingly, respondents in Peru and Bolivia (situated at opposite ends of the 
spectrum in the context of this research), have maintained roughly the same below 
average levels of trust in political parties throughout the 21st century.  Overall, Bolivia 
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registers a 1.5 unit decrease on the x and Peru only registers a .5 unit decrease.  This 
means that there was a larger decline in trust in political parties in Bolivia than Peru. All 
of this suggests that increasing representation by incorporating formerly marginalized 
groups does not necessarily translate into higher levels of trust within the mainstream 
population.   
Ecuador’s trust in political parties follows a positive trend, which coincides with 
most of Correa’s time in power.  Trust declines in Ecuador post-2014, shortly before the 
election of Moreno.  This is counterintuitive because Correa and Moreno were from the 
same party, Alianza Pais (AP), therefore one would expect similar levels of trust.  This 
suggests that peoples’ perception of a political party is heavily influenced by their 
opinion of its leader.  Correa, and AP by default, were widely popular among poor, rural, 
working class and mestizo voters.  Once elected, Moreno immediately reversed nearly all 
of Correa’s social spending policies and enacted extreme austerity measures to address an 
impending economic crisis.  This caused him to lose the support of the electorate who 






















On average, Peruvians have consistently lower levels of trust in the president 
from 2000-2020, which is consistent with expectations.  The 1 unit spike in 2012 
coincides with the presidency of Ollanta Humala.  Humala espoused a left-leaning 
populist rhetoric while campaigning and throughout the beginning stages of his term.  
Shortly into his presidency, he began embracing the garden variety resource extraction 
based neoliberal model common to the region.  While the pivot to neoliberalism was 
supported by the private sector elites, to the mainstream population it revealed Humala to 
be yet another disingenuous politician, flip flopping between stances to suit his personal 
objectives.  Trust increases in Peru in 2016, which coincides with Vizcarra’s assuming 
office.  Vizcarra enjoyed extensive support among the larger population for his strenuous 
commitment to combatting corruption in the government.   
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In Bolivia, Morales maintained slightly above average levels of trust within the 
larger population throughout his presidency.  In Ecuador, levels of trust in the president 
are consistent with levels of trust in political parties:  increasing under Correa, then 
sharply declining under Moreno.  In Ecuador, Correa’s generous social expenditures 
provided under a clientelist system sharply contrasts with Moreno’s austerity measures, 
suggesting that overall trust in government institutions is associated with the state’s 
provision of benefits. 
 




Figure 6 shows us that in Ecuador and Bolivia, where the inclusion of indigenous 
movements has increased participation to formerly disenfranchised citizens, people may 
feel that politics is more accessible.  Accessibility of politics instills a sense of agency 
over the unseen forces that impact peoples’ lives.  Levels of political efficacy in Peru are 
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lower than in Ecuador and Bolivia across the board, which aligns with expectations given 
the chronic government corruption and resulting distrust among the larger population.  It 
is notable that efficacy levels in Peru are highest from 2016-2019, which coincides with 
Vizcarra’s time in office. 
 




According to Figure 7, respondents in all 3 countries report average levels of 
understanding of politics from 2008-2019.  One would expect to see Ecuador and Bolivia 
have significantly higher levels of efficacy than Peru given that expanded avenues to 
participation is indicative of a more representative democracy.  The fact that levels are 
basically consistent across all three countries suggests that citizens remain widely 
disconnected from politics.  Graphing interest in politics by year also shows very low 
levels of interest across all years in all countries, which supports the finding that citizens 
are generally disengaged.  
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Summary of Part I findings 
 
Based on the figures above, political attitudes and behavior in Ecuador, Bolivia and 
Peru are generally consistent with the results of the historical analysis. Ecuadorean 
respondents’ higher levels of trust in institutions and lower levels of protesting underpin 
the previous claim that Correa, while remaining unpopular with CONAIE, enjoyed 
widespread support among mainstream voters, most likely for his generous social 
spending.  Peru’s respondents showed consistently lower levels of trust and efficacy and 
higher levels of protesting.  Taken as a whole, these results are indicative of pervasive 
disengagement, most likely the result of widespread dissatisfaction with a dysfunctional 
political system, comprised of corrupt institutions and inept leaders.   
One would expect to see Bolivia have similar results as Ecuador, given the 
parallels between the strong indigenous movements and left leaning populist presidents 
both of whom served for roughly a decade in power.  Counterintuitively, Bolivia’s results 
are closer to Peru than Ecuador overall, especially regarding participation in protests, 
trust in political parties, voting intentions and trust in the president.  Furthermore, all 
three countries have the same average to low levels of political efficacy over time.  All of 
this is to suggest that expanding participation and representation in a democratic system 
does not necessarily translate into higher amounts of engagement or support within the 
larger population.  
This idea is supported by the discordant type as described in the literature review, 
which posits that presidents and presidential candidates feign support for 
socioeconomically disadvantaged citizens while quietly enacting policies that directly 
benefit elites and preserve the existing social hierarchy.  In other words, because a 
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democracy appears sympathetic to the needs of vulnerable populations does not mean 
that elected officials will represent their interests in good faith.  Therefore, expanding 
participation to formerly disenfranchised and marginalized groups does not necessarily 
translate into higher levels of trust or efficacy in the larger population. 
Part II: Regressions  
Measuring changes in political trust, behavior and efficacy in the larger 
populations of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia helped to reveal general trends overtime.  The 
results of the historical analysis helped contextualize these trends within the broader 
sociopolitical climate of the 21st century.  I will now engage in a more focused analysis 
by employing binomial and ordinal logistic regressions to determine the current state of 
indigenous political attitudes and behavior in 2019.  This year is significant because it is 
immediately following the presidencies of Correa and Morales.  Indigenous movement 
empowerment and growth is directly linked to these presidencies; their respective 
decades in power ushered in a critical turning point in marginalized citizens’ ability to 
advance their rights from within the system.  Analyzing indigenous attitudes and 
behavior in 2019 will illuminate the legacies of Correa and Morales in Ecuador and 
Bolivia, respectively.  Especially in terms of whether the indigenous-state dynamics 
under these two leaders translated into tangible benefits for the larger indigenous 
population.  The control case of Peru will help attribute changes in the dependent variable 
to the effect of indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, as well as highlight what 
is at stake should indigenous people remain on the margins.  In all models, I control for 
the standard socioeconomic and demographic factors, including, age, sex, municipality, 
education, and income. 
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Indigenous Trust in the President  
Prior to the indigenous awakening of the 1990s, this demographic was largely 
overlooked.  Relegated to the margins of society, continue to endure high levels of 
systemic repression.  As indigenous groups across Latin America began organizing in 
opposition to neoliberalism—and finding incremental success-- the existing paradigm 
governing indigenous-state relations began to shift.  In Ecuador and Bolivia, this 
transformation was evidenced by the election of Rafael Correa and Evo Morales, two 
explicitly left leaning, populist presidents with a strong indigenous backing at the start.  
In Peru, where indigenous identity has not achieved salience, numerous presidents over 
the 21st century have courted their widespread electoral support through grand gestures 
and bold promises, with very little of substance actually occurring after their election.   
Using ordinal logistic regression, models 1a-1c examine the relationship between 
trust in the president and indigenous ethnicity in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia using a 2019 
LAPOP question that asks, “To what extent do you trust the president?”  
 
Table 3: Trust in the President 
 Independent Variables Model 1a 


































Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared .020 
N 1481 
This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.          
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
 
 
 Independent Variables Model 1b 

































Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared .100 
N 1495 
This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.          
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
 
 
 Independent Variables Model 1c 

































Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared .023 
N 1420 
This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.          




Models 1a-1c show indigenous likelihood to trust the president in 2019.  The 
variables in this model predict 10% of trust in the president in Bolivia, which is the 
highest percentage of the three models.  When controlling for key socioeconomic and 
demographic indicators, indigenous people in Peru are significantly less likely to trust the 
president than indigenous people in Bolivia, who are slightly more likely.  This is 
counterintuitive to Figure 5, which shows that in 2019, trust in the president in the larger 
population is on the ascent in Peru, and the descent in Bolivia.  This suggests that there is 
a discord between indigenous perceptions of the president and the general population’s 
perceptions of the president in those countries.  Indigenous ethnicity was not significant 
in the case of Ecuador when predicting trust in the president, which is to be expected 
given the overwhelming and immediate dissatisfaction with Lenin Moreno throughout 
Ecuador.  This result tells us that indigenous ethnicity was not a factor when determining 
trust in Moreno, because nobody really seemed to trust him.  Municipality is significant 
in all models, which shows that where people live—rural town, large city, etc.—impacts 
the likelihood of whether they trust the president. 
 
Indigenous Participation in Protests 
Table 4: Participation in Protests 




































Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared .014 
N 1477 
This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.          
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
 
 



































Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared .018 
N 1507 
This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.          
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
 































Measured in age cohorts (.026) 
Model 
Summary 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared .051 
N 1427 
This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.          
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
 
Models 2a-2c use binomial logistic regression to explore the relationship between 
participation in a protest and indigenous identity by using a 2019 LAPOP question that 
asks, “Have you participated in a protest in the last 12 months?”  The variable was 
recoded so that (1) has participated in a protest and (0) has not participated.  The 
variables included in this model predict the largest portion of the dependent variable in 
Peru, predicting around 5% of participation in a protest.  All variables in the model 
except income are significant in Peru.  
  In Ecuador, indigenous identity was significant when predicting participation in 
a protest and controlling for key socioeconomic and demographic indicators: .825 more 
indigenous respondents reported having participated in a protest than non-indigenous 
respondents in the last 12 months, on average.  In comparing these results with trends in 
the larger population, we can assume that the levels of protesting in Ecuador shown in 
Figure 2 are indicative of indigenous participation in a protest, which supports the finding 
that, as a proportion of the total population, there were more indigenous protesters than 
non-indigenous from 2000-2020.   
In Bolivia, indigenous identity is insignificant in predicting participation in a 
protest when controlling for all other factors.  Given the trends over time shown in Figure 
2, indigenous identity’s insignificance in predicting protest is consistent with 
expectations because many Bolivians were protesting, not just indigenous Bolivians.  
Moreover, not all of the organizations of the left driving protests identified primarily with 
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indigenous ethnicity (many were labor unions, coca growers, women, etc.), although 
there was likely significant overlap with indigenous identity.   
According to the data, the main differences in protesting behavior in Bolivia and 
Ecuador are that in Bolivia, everyone was protesting, while in Ecuador, it seems that 
mostly indigenous were protesting.  This could be attributed to key internal differences in 
each country’s respective indigenous movement, MAS and CONAIE.  MAS retained a 
broad base of support beyond ethnicity due to its inclusive platform, while CONAIE’s 
platform became increasingly politically and ethnically motivated, which alienated non-
indigenous supporters (Madrid 2012).  Therefore, when these organizations mobilized to 
protest, MAS was able to mobilize support beyond coethnics, while CONAIE did not 
enjoy such broad appeal. 
Voting Behavior 
The original 2019 LAPOP question about voting asks, “If voting were being held 
this week, what would you do?” (1) I would not vote, (2) I would vote for the current 
president or party (3) I would vote for the opposition candidate or party (4) I would turn 
in a blank ballot.  To facilitate binomial logistic regression and to account for the fact that 
voting is mandatory in each of these three cases, the voting variable was recoded to make 
it dichotomous, so that the previous values of (2) and (3) =(1) I would cast a valid vote, 
and the previous values of (1) and (4) =(0) I would cast a blank ballot. 
 Indigenous identity is not significant in predicting voting behavior in any of our 
models.  Indigenous identity is not significant in predicting voting behavior in any of our 
models, which means that an indigenous person is just as likely to cast a valid vote or a 
blank ballot as a non-indigenous person.  A question central to the study of ethnic politics 
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is, are coethnics more likely to support each other electorally, why or why not?  These 
findings suggest that indigenous presidents do not necessarily attract more electoral 
support from indigenous voters.   
Notably, education level is significant in all Models (3a-3c).  Expanding access to 
quality public education has proven a persistent challenge in this region, particularly in 
rural, indigenous areas.  Education level directly impacts the accessibility of conventional 
participation, from knowing how to access and interpret information about voting 
logistics or candidate platforms, to the role of literacy in reading and filling in the ballot.  
Morales and Correa’s social policies included expanding access to bilingual public 
education in the Andean highlands.  These models show that there is a significant link 
between education and casting a valid vote. 
Table 5: Voting Behavior 


































Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared .049 
N 1446 
This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.          







































Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared .016 
N 1374 
This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.          
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
 


































Nagelkerke Pseudo R Squared .031 
N 1384 
This table reports coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.          




CHAPTER 4  
Conclusion 
 
This research attempted to fill a gap within existing literature on the relationships 
between indigenous movements and the state by asking, how do these interactions 
register changes in the larger indigenous population?  The historical analysis provided a 
summary of interactions between indigenous movements and presidents in our three 
cases since 2000, and classified and sorted interactions into a descriptive typology of 
relationship type: supportive, detached, tense and discordant.  Graphing relationship type 
by year in the three countries (Figure 1) illustrated that relationships were generally more 
positive in Bolivia, more neutral in Ecuador and more negative in Peru and found that the 
cases containing larger, more well-organized indigenous movements were associated 
with more positive interaction types, and the case with a weak and fragmented movement 
had more negative relationship types.   
Findings from the Typology of Relationships and Figure 1 suggest that countries 
with stronger indigenous movements experience more institutional instability, manifested 
in erratic presidential patterns and higher levels of protesting.  Bolivia and Ecuador both 
had several partial term presidents each after these presidents were ousted by mass 
protests (in which indigenous movements played a prominent role in all examples except 
Gutierrez in Ecuador).  This string of partial term presidents was followed, 
simultaneously in both countries, by the election of populist leaders who ultimately 
consolidated power through constitutional means and ended up serving over a decade 
each in power.  In stark contrast, Peru, who, although possessing a regionally divided and 
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weak indigenous movement, has had all presidents since 2000 serve full terms (with the 
exception of PPK).  Therefore, the erratic and unpredictable nature of presidential 
continuity in Bolivia and Ecuador may be attributed to the presence of powerful 
indigenous movements in these countries.   
Scholars have theorized about how the inclusion of indigenous movements would 
impact democracy in the region.  Mayorga (2006) argues that their inclusion represents a 
grave threat to democracy, while Rice (2017) and Albó (2004) assert that their inclusion 
represents a strengthening of democratic institutions.  This work suggests that it is not 
one or the other, but both.  While the inclusion of formerly disenfranchised people does 
in fact represent democratic deepening, it also has a destabilizing effect as the system 
must expand and adapt to new actors. 
Counterintuitively, the graphed trends overtime reveals several notable instances 
where Bolivia and Peru were more similar than would have been expected (see Figures 2, 
4, and 5).  This suggests that a more inclusive and representative democracy through the 
inclusion of indigenous movements does not necessarily translate into broad mainstream 
support.  Indicators for political efficacy and interest in politics are below average across 
the whole timeframe and show very little variability by country, which is indicative of the 
polarization and mass disengagement with politics in the region.  
 This work presents several opportunities for continued research.  First, the 
relationship types in the descriptive typology were classified after undertaking an in-
depth survey of scholarly works and newspaper articles.  In the future, it would be helpful 
to develop a set of measurable indicators based on recurring themes in interactions to 
classify types in a more systematic and empirical manner.  Additionally, discussion of the 
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regression findings in this work only featured an explanation of variable significance and 
direction.  Future research will offer a more in-depth analysis of the relationships 
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